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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16575 
and 16738 
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and 
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants appeal from a jury verdict finding 
them guilty of the offense of Theft, in violation of § 76-6-404 
and § 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. The 
charge was based on appellants' exercise of unauthorized 
control over the property of another with the intent to deprive 
him of his property. The property stolen was cash in an amount 
exceeding $250.00 but less than $1,000.00. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were tried before a jury on March 29, 1979, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding. Pursuant to the it 
verdict, Judge Ballif sentenced both appellants to an ind~ 
minate term not to exceed five years imprisonment in the u: 
State Prison. Appellant Whittenback was sentenced on June 
1979 and appellant Parrett was sentenced on October 12, 19: 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions m 
sentences of each appellant, as well as affirmance of the 
District Court orders denying appellants' Motion to Suppre: 
evidence and denying their motions for directed verdict a~ 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 28, 1978, Officer Craig Geslison of the 
Provo City Police Department responded to a request that he 
investigate suspicious persons at the Pine View Apartments 
Provo (R. 146) . 1 Officer Geslison encountered the appellfil 
as the suspects of the suspicious person report and aftera 
two-hour investigation found marijuana and a bag of coins: 
appellants' vehicle (R. 155, 160). No arrest was made at 
that time(R. 155). 
At about 1:00 a.m. on March 26, 1979, Officer Gi 
1 Citations to the transcript of the Hearing on appellant5 
Motion to Suppress and the Transcript of Trial are he~ 
referred to by the page of the Record (e.g. R.l) · 
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was patrolling an area of Provo in which there had been 
several thefts from businesses (R. 147, 53). He was alerted 
to the prior criminal activity by reading a Police Department 
''speed letter" which stated that more patrolling was needed 
in the area because of the recent thefts (R. 158). Officer 
Geslison noticed the appellants, whom he recognized from the 
previous encounter, within an all-night laundromat called 
"The Wash Hut". (R. 55, 56). His attention was drawn to them 
by his previous encounter with them, the fact that they were 
the only individuals in the laundromat, and his knowledge that 
they resided in Salt Lake City ( R. 147, 56). 
After calling for assistance, Officer Geslison 
entered the Wash Hut and asked appellants what they were doing 
and for identification (R. 56, 147). Appellant Parrett 
responded that they were in Provo visiting his ex-wife, but 
claimed he did not know where his ex-wife lived (R. 147). 
Officer Geslison then asked who owned the vehicle 
parked in front of the Wash Hut. Appellant Parrett responded 
that it was his car (R. 57, 148). When asked if the officer 
could search the car, appellant Parrett responded "Yes," or 
"Yes, you can go ahead and search it." (R. 58, 148) . Officers 
Michael Mock and Bradley Leatham arrived and were instructed 
by Officer Geslison to search the vehicle (R. 147-148, 57-58, 
166, 182). 
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While the other officers searched the car, and 
pursuant to his observation of "bulges" in the appellants' 
pockets and of two "ace'' lock picks on the floor under 
appellant Whittenback's seat, Officer Geslison asked the 
appellants to empty their pockets (R. 58, 149-150). AppeL 
Parrett emptied his pockets immediately, but appellant 
Whittenback asked what authority the officer had for this 
request lR. 58, 149). Officer Mock then re-entered t~ 
Wash Hut, having completed the search of the vehicle, and 
placed both appellants under arrest for possession of bm~ 
tools (R. 80, 149, 184). Appellant Whi ttenback emptied hi: 
pockets after being placed under arrest (R. 149). 
The officers found a large amount of quarters an: 
dimes (the denominations required to operate the machines: 
the Wash Hut) in appellant Whittenback's pockets. (R. 58, 
153). They also found that appellant Parrett' s pockets co: 
tained a key ring with a key on it which Officer Geslison 
recognized as being the type used to open washing machines 
(R. 60-61, 64, 152-153). Pursuant to their search of the 
vehicle, Officers Leatham and Mock found two "Valley Ba~· 
bags containing a large amount of quarters and dimes, seve: 
machine keys, an "ace" lock pick with instructions, and a: 
of needle-nose pliers. They also found several other mach: 
keys, a white sock full of dimes, and a screwdriver withE 
-4-
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altered head (R. 76-79, 86, 153-154). Approximately $596.00 
in coins was found either on appellants' persons or in the 
vehicle (R. 78, 66, 153). 
William Victor Oldroyd, the owner of the Wash Hut, 
was notified by the police officers of the theft on March 26, 
1979 and went to the Wash Hut at that time (R. 27-28). Mr. 
Oldroyd determined that the coin boxes on fourteen washers and 
two dryers had been opened (R. 30-31) . He then counted the 
money remaining in the machines that had not been tampered 
with and estimated that roughly $600.00 to $800.00 was missing 
(R. 31-32, 39, 48). Mr. Oldroyd also successfully opened several 
of the washing machines and dryers with one of the "ace" lock 
picks found in appellants' possession (R. 32-33). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL INQUIRY OF APPELLANTS WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND WAS THUS PERMISSIBLE. 
Appellants contend that the initial entry into the 
Wash Hut and questioning of appellants by Officer Geslison 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in that the officer did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that appellants were engaged in criminal conduct. 
Respondent rejects this contention and submits that when the 
-5-
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facts and circumstances are viewed in light of Officer 
Geslison's knowledge, the officer was justified in making 
the initial inquiry and questioning of appellants. 
The case of Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), up: 
which appellants rely, established that a police officerrn: 
detain and question a person based on information which fa: 
short of establishing probable cause to arrest the person. 
The facts of Terry are similar in many respects to the cas, 
at bar. There, an experienced Cleveland Police Officer,~ 
patrolling on foot, had his attention attracted to two per: 
who repeatedly walked up and down a street pausing to look 
into a particular store window each time they passed. The 
officer suspected that they might be "casing" the store ~ 
contemplation of a possible robbery and thus approached thE 
individuals to question them. When they gave evasive answE 
the officer also frisked them for weapons. 
In upholding both the stop and the frisk, the 
United States Supreme Court wrote: 
. there is no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search or seize 
against the invasion which the search 
or seizure entails. . And in justifying 
the particular intrusion, the police 
officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion. 
392 U.S. 1, 21. 
-6-
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The Court reserved the issue of when a seizure would be 
justified for purposes of detention and/or interrogation, 
Terry, supra, n. 16. In that footnote the Court observed: 
Obviously, not all personal 
intercourse between policemen and 
citizens involves "seizures" of 
persons. Only when the officer, 
by means of physical force or show 
of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen 
may we conclude that a "seizure" 
has occurred. 
392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16. 
Respondent submits that in the case at bar, Officer 
Geslison's initial entry into the Wash Hut and preliminary 
questioning of appellants did not constitute a sufficient 
show of authority nor a restraining of appellants' liberty 
to constitute a "seizure." Thus, the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment do not apply to this initial encounter. 
In the case of People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562 
(N.Y. 1976), the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that 
in s~me circumstances police officers may approach persons 
to conduct a preliminary inquiry on facts falling short of 
the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry, supra. In 
Debour, two police officers, while walking down a street soon 
after midnight, noticed an individual walking towards them 
on the same side of the street. When the person got within 
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thirty feet of the officers he quickly crossed the street. 
The officers also crossed and asked the defendant what he 
was doing in the area and for identification. Observing 
a bulge under defendant's jacket, the officers asked him to 
unzip his jacket, which he did, revealing a loaded revolv~ 
in his waistband which the officers seized. 
In holding that this conduct did not constitute 
a "seizure" the Court wrote: 
This case raises the fundamental 
issue of whether or not a police officer, 
in the absence of any concrete indication 
of criminality, may approach a private 
citizen on the street for the purpose of 
requesting information. We hold that he 
may. The basis for this inquiry need not 
rest on any indication of criminal activity 
on the part of the person of whom inquiry 
is made but there must be some articulable 
reason sufficient to justify the police 
action which was taken. 
352 N.E.2d 562, 565. 
In deciding a companion case, People v. LaPene, the court 
indicated how this analysis fits with the ''reasonable sus~ 
standard: 
. We bear in mind that any 
inquiry into the propriety of police 
conduct must weigh the interference 
it entails against the precipitating 
and attending conditions. By this 
approach various intensities of police 
action are justifiable as the precip-
itating and attendant factors increase 
in weight and competence. The minimal 
intrusion of approaching to request 
information is permissible when there 
-8-
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is some objective credible reason for 
~ha~ in~erference not necessarily 
indicative of criminality (People v. 
De Bour, supra). The next degree, the 
common-law right to inquire, is activated 
by a founded suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot and permits a somewhat 
greater intrusion in that a policeman is 
entitled to interfere with a citizen to 
~he exte~t necessary to gain explanatory 
information, but short of a forcible 
seizure. Where a police officer enter-
tains a reasonable suspicion that a 
particular person has committed, is 
committing or is about to commit a felony 
or misdemeanor, this authorizes a forcible 
stop and detention of that person. 
352 N.E.2d 562, 571-572. 
Thus, all that is required for an initial confrontation between 
police and citizens in public places is an articulable, 
objective reason for the inquiry. 
In the case at bar, Officer Geslison had at least 
sufficient knowledge to justify his entry into the Wash Hut, 
his preliminary questioning of appellants, and his asking 
them for identification, under the De Bour standard. In 
State v. Larson, Wash. App., 587 P.2d 171 (1978), the court 
applied the De Bour rationale to a factual situation similar 
to the instant case. In Larson, officers saw several people 
in a car parked in a no-parking zone in a closed park late 
at night in an area in which many burglaries had recently oc-
curred. The officers approached the car and asked each occupant 
-9-
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for identification. As the defendant opened her purse to 
obtain identification, the officers saw and seized a bag of 
marijuana from the purse. In upholding the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, the 
court stated: 
While the presence of individuals 
wandering abroad late at night or at an 
unusual hour should not of itself pre-
cipitate a police investigation, it is 
a circumstance justifying suspicion . 
Taking it in combination with factors 
such as the defendant's being seated 
in a car parked in a no-parking zone 
near a closed park in an area, where 
numerous burglaries had occurred pre-
viously, police suspicion of illegal 
conduct was justifiable. Under such 
circumstances, the police may ask for 
identification . 
587 P.2d 171, 172-173. See also State v. Warner, Ore., SB: 
P.2d 681 (1978) at 689. 
Here, Officer Geslison knew that there had been 
several thefts committed in the area of the Wash Hut (R. 1: 
he knew that the appellants were alone inside the laundrorna 
he knew from a previous encounter with appellants that tt~ 
were from Salt Lake City and that they had on the prior 
occasion been in possession of contraband and a bag full o: 
coins (R. 66, 147, 155, 160). This gave him at least an 
"objective credible reason" to enter the laundromat, a pubi 
place where he had a right to be and to ask appellants wh~ 
-10-
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they were doing and for identification. There was no seizure 
or detention of appellants to this point, since the officer 
did not restrain their freedom to leave. Rather, Officer 
Geslison's conduct constituted mere "threshold questioning" 
of the appellants. People v. Gurule, Colo., 471 P.2d 413, 
416 (1970). 
In the recent case of State v. Marks, Kan., 602 
P.2d 1344 (1979), the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that 
where an officer does not stop a moving vehicle, but merely 
approaches the defendant sitting in a parked vehicle there is 
no detention of the defendant and hence no seizure. In the 
case at bar, there was also no "stopping" of the appellants 
since they were stationary in a place of public business at 
the time when the officer approached. Since appellants did 
not even have the immediate capability of moving when first 
approached, as did the defendant in Marks, supra, if there 
was no ''seizure" there, there certainly was no seizure in 
this case. 
Even if this Court finds that Officer Geslison's 
conduct constituted a "detention" or "seizure" of the appellants, 
such conduct was justified under the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard of Terry. Since Terry, most courts have recognized 
that: 
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. the governmental interest in 
effective crime prevention underlies 
the recognition that a police officer 
may in appropriate circumstances and 
in an appropriate manner approach a 
person for investigating possible 
criminal behavior, even though there 
is no probable cause to make an arrest. 
People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P.2d 120, 123 (1975) (emphasis 
added). See also State v. Post, 573 P.2d 153 (Idaho 1978): 
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977); United Statesy 
:Seek, 598 F. 2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the Terry standa. 
::::': "reasonable suspicion" applies to detentions to investis 
possible criminal activity. 
that: 
In State v. Folkes, supra, this Court recognized 
When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and investiga-
tions to determine whether the law is being 
violated; and if so, to take such measures 
as are necessary in the enforcement of the 
law. 
565 P.2d 1125, 1127. The Court also reiterated the test af 
in Utah as to the propriety of searches and seizures: 
It is to be borne in mind that it 
is not all searches and seizures with-
out a warrant which are proscribed by 
the constitutional provisions referred 
to. It is only of a search which is 
"unreasonable." It is commonly and 
properly stated that the question as to 
whether a search is unreasonable depends 
-12-
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upon the particular circumstances; and 
the question to be answered is whether 
reasonable and fair minded persons would 
judge the alleged search or seizure to 
be unreasonable or oppressive. 
565 P.2d 1125, 1127. When viewed in the light of this test, 
Officer Geslison's conduct in approaching and questioning 
the appellants was not only ''reasonable," but was based on 
articulable facts giving him reasonable suspicion to believe 
appellants were engaged in a crime. In such a situation, the 
officer has a duty to make an investigation into the circum-
stances. The facts within Officer Geslison's knowledge, 
detailed above, clearly distinguish this case from cases cited 
by the appellants where officers were found to have no reason-
able suspicion for an initial stop or detention (e.g. In re 
Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978) cited at p.9 of Appellants' 
Brief) . It is simply not true, as appellants assert, that all 
Officer Geslison knew was . that the appellants were from 
out-of-town, that they were in an all-night establishment late 
at night, and that they were doing laundry." Appellant's Brief 
at p.17. He also had within his mind the information gained 
from the previous encounter with appellants and the information 
that several businesses in the area had recently been burglarized. 
The initial encounter between Officer Geslison was lawful and 
did not violate appellants' Fourth Amendment rights. 
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POINT II 
THE REQUEST TO APPELLANTS TO EMPTY 
THEIR POCKETS, ASSUMING IT WAS A 
"SEARCH," WAS JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT 
TO A LAWFUL ARREST. 
Appellants assert that Officer Geslison' s request 
that they empty their pockets was an unlawful search. Altl 
the case law is sparse on this subject, it seems that a r& 
from an officer to a suspect that the latter empty his poc! 
C.oes c::::istitute a "search." United States v. DiGiacomo, 5· 
F.2C.. 1211 (10th Cir. 1978); State v. Garcia, 493 P.2d 975 
(N.M. App. 1972). Assuming that the request in this case c 
constitute a "search," respondent submits that as to both 
appellants the search was proper as incident to a lawful M 
based on probable cause. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that the basic 
standard for arrest without a warrant was set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 1: 
This Court has adopted that standard in State v. Hatcher,: 
Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972), wherein the test is sta: 
as follows: 
The determination should be made 
on an objective standard: whether from 
the facts known to the officer, and 
the inferences which fairly might be 
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent person in his position would 
be justified in believing that the 
suspect had comrr,itted the offense. 
-14-
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495 P.2d 1259, 1260. See also State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972). In addition, this Court has 
stated often that the determination as to whether the arrest 
is based on probable cause is primarily for the trial court 
and will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly in error. 
State v. Eastmond, supra,; State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 
197 6) . 
The propriety of a warrantless search incident to 
a lawful arrest was recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). This 
Court has also recognized this exception to the general 
requirement of a warrant for conducting a search. State v. 
Eastmond, supra; State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978). 
It has also been widely recognized that even though the search 
itself precedes the formality of an arrest, the search is still 
incident to arrest if at the time of the search the officer 
had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest. State v. 
Means, 581 P.2d 406 (Mont. 1978); People v. Terry, 454 P.2d 
36 (Cal. 1969); State v. Carroll, 526 P. 2d 1238 (Ariz. 1974), 
in which the Arizona Court held there is no constitutional right 
to be arrested before a search. In State v. White, supra, 
this Court wrote: 
. if such probable cause for arrest 
exists independent of any evidence ob-
tained as a result of the search, the 
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fact that the search was conducted before 
the arrest does not invalidate the search 
nor preclude its characterization as being 
incident to arrest. 
577 P.2d 552, 553. 
Applying these rules to the facts of the case at 
bar, first, Officer Geslison had probable cause to arrest 
appellants before he requested them to empty their pockets. 
As shown in POINT I, supra, he had reasonable suspicion to 
believe they were committing a crime as he entered the laur. 
and sues~ioned appellants. Subsequent to the questioning, 
Officer Geslison noticed bulges in all four of appellant 
Whittenback's pockets as well as two lock picks of the ~~ 
used to open the coin boxes on washing machines resting oo 
the floor below where Whittenback was sitting. (R. 58, 14: 
This observation verified his earlier suspicion that appeL 
were stealing money and gave him objectively verifiable 
probable cause to arrest appellants before he asked them tc 
empty their pockets, cf. Post v. State, 563 P.2d 1193 (Okl. 
Cr. 1977). 
Second, as to appellant Parrett, the search was 
complete before Officer Mock returned from searching the 
vehicle and placed appellants formally under arrest. Howe· 
since a search preceding arrest may be incident thereto ~ 
long as the searching officer had probable cause to arrest. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in this case that search was incident to the arrest. The 
search of appellant Whittenback was not completed until 
after the formal arrest and thus does not present the 
preceding-search problem (R. 149). 
Finally, it is well-established that the scope of 
a search incident to arrest extends to anything unlawfully 
within the suspect's possession. State v. Jackson, 539 P.2d 
906 (Ariz. 1975); Agnello v. United States, 296 U.S. 20 (1925) 
[fruits of crime]; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 
(197 3). Thus, since the search here produced coins from the 
washing machines and a machine key with which the crime was 
committed, the search was not unduly broad (R. 58, 60-61, 64, 
152-153). 
POINT III 
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS PURSUANT 
TO CONSENT AND WAS THUS LAWFUL. 
Appellants argue that the search of their car was 
unlawful because it was undertaken without a warrant and not 
pursuant to any exception to the requirement of a warrant. 
Respondent submits that the threshold question to be answered 
regarding this issue is whether or not appellants have 
standing in this Court to challenge the legality of the search. 
It has been generally recognized that a defendant 
has no standing to challenge the legality of a search on appeal 
where he has no possessory or proprietary interest in the 
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premises searched. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
(1960); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). In the 
recent case of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), t~ 
United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 
defendant has standing whenever a search is "directed" at 
him. The Court stated that the issue was not really whethE 
a defendant has standing, but rather is a question of "su~ 
stantive Fourth Amendment doctrine" which must be answered 
in light of traditional principles of defendant's reason~ 
privacy interest in the premises searched. 439 U.S. 128, '. 
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether or not appellants ha 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded area. i 
they did not, their Fourth Amendment rights were not violat 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
In Rakas, supra, the Court dealt with this issue 
the factual context of a search of a car. In 'holding that 
petitioners had no property or possessory interest in the 
portions of the car searched, the Court recognized that t~ 
expectation of privacy as to an automobile is less extensh 
than that pertaining to a house or apartment. (See e.g. ~ 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). 
In the case at bar, appellants may not challenge 
legality of the search both because they had no legitimaU 
expectation of privacy in the automobile and because they 
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had no possessory or proprietary interest in the car. In 
Rakas, supra, the Court recognized that use of a vehicle 
with the consent of the owner does not establish an expecta-
tion of privacy in that vehicle. 439 U.S. 128, 148. It is 
clear from the record in this case that the vehicle searched 
was not registered to either of the appellants (R. 187). 
Nothing in the record shows that appellants had a legitimate 
interest of privacy in the car. 
As to appellants' contention that the search was 
not lawful, respondent submits that the search of the car was 
justified under both the automobile exception and the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement. The automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement was recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925): 
[T]he guaranty of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures 
by the Fourth Amendment has been 
construed, practically since the 
beginning of the government, as 
recognizing a necessary difference 
between a store, dwelling house, or 
other structure in respect of which 
a proper official warrant may readily 
be obtained and a search of a ship, 
motor boat, wagon, or automobile for 
contraband goods, where it is not 
practicable to secure a warrant, 
because the vehicle can be quickly 
moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant 
must be sought . 
. The measure of legality of 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such a seizure is, therefore, that 
the seizing officer have reasonable 
or probable cause for believing that 
the automobile which he stops and 
seizes has contraband . . therein . 
267 U.S. 132, 153-156. The Court later recognized in 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) that for constitu-
tional purposes, there is no difference between seizing thE 
car at the scene and waiting for a search warrant and im~ 
searching the car at the scene. 
This Court has adopted the position that where a 
vehicle retains a reasonable degree of mobility and office: 
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contr~ 
or evidence of a er ime, the search may be made immediately 
without a warrant. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (1978), St1 
v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405 , 503 P.2d 848 (1972). 
Applying this rule to the facts of the instant ca 
it is clear that Officers Geslison, Leatham, and Mock h~ 
probable cause to believe the appellants' vehicle conta~~ 
both the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime. Off~ 
Geslison's knowledge establishing probable cause for arre~ 
of the appellants is detailed, supra, in POINT I. When to 
that knowledge is added his recollection that in his previ( 
encounter with appellants, the investigating officers fo~ 
marijuana and a bag of coins in appellants' vehicle, pr~c 
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cause to believe appellants' vehicle contained contraband 
and evidence of crime is established (R. 160). Although 
Officer Geslison did not personally conduct the search, but 
rather directed Officer Mock and Leatham to do so, this does 
not destroy the probable cause. In State v. Groda, Ore., 
591 P.2d 1354 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court held: 
. [T)he searching officer 
personally must have information 
which constitutes probable cause, 
or the searching officer must be 
directed to make the search by 
an officer who personally has that 
knowledge. 
591 P.2d 1354 (emphasis added). 
In addition, the exigency of mobility of the car 
was present in this case. If the car was not searched or 
seized at the scene it could have been freely moved out of 
the jurisdiction of the officers either by appellants or 
others. In Chambers, supra, it was recognized that if the 
officers could seize the car and search it later, they can 
also search it immediately at the scene of the crime. 
Appellants' argument that the automobile exception is not 
available in this case is based solely on the case of Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Coolidge is inapposite 
here because on the facts there the searching officers had no 
reason to believe the car might contain contraband or evidence 
of crime. 
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Finally, the search of appellants' car was con-
ducted pursuant to freely given consent of appellant Pu~ 
It has long been recognized that officers may conduct a 
warrantless search where the defendant consents to such a 
search. See e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (19C 
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). In the case of 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973}, the Unitec 
States Supreme Court, reaffirming that a warrantless conse 
sear2h is valid, held that the prosecution has the burd~ 
establishing from the totality of the circumstances that~ 
consent was voluntarily given. However, the prosecutioni 
not required to prove that the defendant knew of his righ: 
to refuse to consent in order to show voluntariness. 412 
U.S. 218, 233-234; 248-249. 
It has also been held that: 
. the fact of custody alone 
has never been enough in itself to 
demonstrate a coerced confession or 
consent to search. 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976). This: 
has held in accordance in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 57, ~ 
P.2d 772 (1969) and State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah lg: 
See also United States v. Shields, 573 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 
In People v. Havhurst, Colo., 571 P.2d 721 (191' 
the Colorado Supreme Court, in upholding a search as beir.c 
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consensual, delineated several factors which taken together 
may show lack of duress or coercion. Those factors include: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the 
officers, 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers, 3) a mere request to search, 4) cooperation by the 
owner of the vehicle, and, 5) the absence of deception or 
trick on the part of the officers. 
Respondent submits that each of the factors in 
Hayhurst, supra, are also present on the facts of the case 
at bar. At the time when Officer Geslison asked appellants 
for permission to search the car, all he had done was ask 
them for their identification and ask preliminary questions. 
(R. 178) . Appellants were not in custody at the time and 
although Officers Mock and Leatham arrived before consent 
was given, Mock did not enter the Wash Hut (R. 182) and 
Leatham entered just as consent was being given (R. 166), 
thus, the presence of additional officers did not create an 
undue show of authority. When Officer Geslison requested 
permission to search, he did not claim any authority to 
search or deceive appellants into thinking he had a search 
warrant (R. 57-58, 148). He simply asked if the appellant 
Parrett would consent to the search, to which Parrett responded 
"Yes," or "Yes, you can go ahead and search it." (R. 58, 148). 
Finally, none of the officers used force or threats of force 
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to obtain the consent. 
Under the totality of circumstances test, these 
facts establish that the respondent met its burden of prov: 
that the consent given by appellant Parrett to search the'. 
was voluntary. 
POINT IV 
THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY TAKEN 
BY APPELLANTS EXCEEDED $250.00 
Appellants aver that there was no substantial 
competent evidence adduced at trial to establish that the 
value of the property stolen was more than $250. 00 but les; 
than $1, 000. 00. However, appellants attempt in their Brie: 
to confuse the issue by comparing proof of the amount of c 
stolen with proof of the value of other types of proper~ 
which have independent market value. Respondent rejects t 
analogy and respectfully submits that this element of the 
crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by substantial 
competent evidence. 
The cases appellants cite which discuss the ~~ 
of evidence necessary to prove value of property which has 
an independent market value are inapposite here. This is 
because cash does not have independent market value, but 
rather the value of cash is its face value. See United St: 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, and Knox v. Lee, 79 u.s. 
457 (1870) The Legal Tender Cases. The only issue which must 
be proved in a case in which cash was stolen is the amount 
thereof, since the value is fixed by Congress. 
Respondent agrees with appellants that: 
[T]he weight of evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses are reserved 
exclusively for the jury, and this 
Court will not interfere unless the 
evidence is found to be so lacking and 
insubstantial that reasonable men could 
not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977). See also State in 
the Interest of M. S., 584 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). The State here introduced 
the testimony of William Victor Oldroyd, the owner of the 
Wash Hut, as to how much money was stolen by the appellants 
from his establishment. Mr. Oldroyd established that he went 
to the Wash Hut at the request of the police on March 26, 1979 
at about 1:00 a.m. (R. 28). He found that 14 of his 50 washing 
machines had been broken into as well as 2 of his 25 dryers 
(R. 28-31) . Those machines that had been broken into had no 
coins in them at all (R. 32). Mr. Oldroyd, after counting the 
money remaining in the other machines, determined that to 
the best of his knowledge $600.00 to $800.00 was missing from 
the machines (R. 32, 38, 47-48). He also established that 
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most of the machines generate approximately the same am~M 
of money (R. 32). 
When this testimony is tested in light of the fa: 
that Mr. Oldroyd had owned and operated the Wash Hut for 
twelve years, it is clear that this was substantial compet, 
evidence of the amount of money taken (R. 27) • Further, t: 
total amount of money found in appellants' possession was 
almost $600.00, corroborating Mr. Oldroyd's "guess" and 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that more than $25C. 
was taken by appellants (R. 66, 78, 153). 
In a similar case, State v. Swanson, 440 P.2d 4S: 
(Wash. 1968), the defendant was charged with grand larce~ 
which required proof that he stole property of more than I: 
in value. The owner of the service station testified that 
amount missing was $104.00, based on his counting of thec 
left in the cash register. The Washington Supreme Court~ 
that this evidence was sufficient to make out the "value" 
element of the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, respondent respectfully submits t 
the initial contact between the officers and the appellant: 
the "search" of appellants' pockets, and the search of the 
vehicle, were all reasonable under all the circumstances, 
set forth above. Thus, appellants' Fourth Amendment right 
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were not violated in this case. In addition, the State of 
Utah proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants stole 
property having a value of over $250.00 but less than $1,000.00. 
For these reasons, and based on the argument herein, respondent 
requests that appellants' convictions and sentences be affirmed 
as well as the orders of the lower court denying appellants' 
motions to supress evidence, for a directed verdict, and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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